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THE DISTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE DIVIDENDS
ALEXANDER HAMILTON FREY t
Of primary importance to the investor in corporate shares is the
dividend return. But many a purchaser of shares has other dominant
interests. He may desire merely to qualify to be a director. He may
be a "pirate" and contenplate a particular suit which he can institute
only as a shareholder. He may hope to acquire the right of a share-
holder to examine the stock ledger or other books or records of the
corporation in order to broaden his activities as a broker or promoter.
He may seek to gain control of the corporation in order to loot it, or
to preclude it from competing with some other enterprise in which he
is primarily interested. He may be a speculator buying shares to cover
a previous "short" sale, or in anticipation of a rising market and a
profitable resale. No one of these persons has the interest of an in-
vestor. The investor buys shares for the long pull, and while he will
be gratified by an appreciation in market value, his major concern is
with income, i. e. dividends.
One investing in corporate shares, whether an individual or an
institution, desires the corporation to make the maximum possible
profits and to distribute such profits in the form of dividends as rapidly
as may be consistent with the continuation of maximum profits in the
future. But this may not be the goal of the corporation's management.
In many modern corporations the ownership of the shares is so widely
scattered that the management, i. e. executive officers and directors,
through control of the proxy process for shareholders' meetings, is
self-perpetuating." Where such management control exists, the mem-
bers of the management may own very few shares, as personal share-
holdership is not the basis of their control. And where the officers and
directors themselves own very few shares, their interest in the corpora-
tion may relate primarily to matters other than the distribution of
profits. They may develop philanthropic interests such as raising liv-
ing standards by increasing wages as rapidly as competitive conditions
allow, or by progressively producing more and cheaper units to the
benefit of the consuming public. Or they may be interested not in dis-
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tributing profits, but in ploughing them back into the enterprise in order
to magnify the size of the business and thereby improve their own
power and prestige or strengthen their claim to huge salaries and
bonuses.
Where such a conflict of interests between management and share-
holders exists, the law has developed in such a way as to favor manage-
ment. In two important respects management may legally exercise a
very high degree of discretion. First, management is permitted flexibil-
ity in the application of accounting practices so that it can affect the
size of the surplus or net earnings available for dividends. 2  For exam-
ple, it may elect to write off items such as depreciation or obsolescence
at a slow or at a rapid rate; it may elect to regard expenditures on new
equipment as operating expenses or as deferred assets; it may carry
good will at zero or at a substantial figure. While it is not the purpose
of this article to examine the legal and accounting principles for ascer-
taining the fund from which dividends may be paid,3 but only to con-
sider conflicting claims to the distribution of such fund, it is important
to note that in the matters indicated above, as well as in many others,
discretionary decisions of management will seriously affect the size and
even the very existence of the fund available for dividends. The man-
ner in which this discretion is exercised may be of extreme importance
to the holders of certain classes of shares, e. g. non-cumulative preferred
shares, whose rights to specific dividends may depend, at least in some
jurisdictions, upon whether or not there were undistributed profits in
the past.
4
Secondly, even after it has been established that there are net earn-
ings available for dividends, management is given almost unlimited dis-
cretion as to whether the fund shall be distributed to the shareholders
or retained in the enterprise.5 This discretion is not confined to divi-
2. See GRAHAM. AND KATZ, ACCOUNTING IN LAW PRACTIcE (932) chs. ig and 2o;
HILLS, ACCOUNTING IN COR'ORTION LAw (1937) ; Berle and Fisher, Elcments of Ike
Law of Business Accounting (1932) 32 CoL L. REv. 573; Bonbright and Weiner,
Theory of Anglo-Aenwrican Diidend Law: Surplus and Profits (1930) 30 COL. L REv.
330, 354-
3. See Katz, Accounting Problems in Corporate Distributions (1941) 89 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 764, infra in this issue.
4. See infra at 75o et seq.
5. Wabash R. R. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 F. (2d) 335, 342 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1925) ; W. Q. O'Neall Co. v. O'Neall, 25 N. E. (2d) 656 (Ind. App. i94o);
Schmitt v. Eagle Roller Mill Co., 199 Minn. 382, 272 N. W. 277 (937) ; Shonnard v.
Elevator Supplies Co., III N. J. Eq. 94, 161 Atl. 684 (1932); City Bank Farmers'
Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 257 N. Y. 62, 177 N. E. 3o9 (1931) ; Green v. Phila-
delphia Inquirer Co., 329 Pa. i69, 196 At]. 32 (1938) ; Jones v. Motor Sales Co. of
Johnstown, 322 Pa. 492, 185 Atl. 8og (1936) ; BALLANTINE, MANUAL OF CORPORATION
LAW AND PRACTICE (1930) § 157; 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (1932)
802; STEVENS. PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1936) § 99. For instances of limitations upon
the directors' discretion see In re Brantman, 244 Fed. oi (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) ; Chan-
non v. Chafinor Co., 218 Ill. App. 397 (1920); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich.
459, 170 N. W. 668 (I919) ; Seitz v. Union Brass and Metal Mfg. Co.,.152 Minn. "460,
189 N. W. 586 (1922) ; and Lawton v. Bedell, 71 Atl. 490 (N. J. Eq. 19o8).
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dends on common shares; it extends as well to dividends on all types
of preferred shares." Consequently, if the interest of management lies
in expanding the wealth under its control, profits may for years be
hidden or, where revealed. ploughed back into the corporation. And
as the saturation point for expansion approaches, the profits, if any, on
the reinvested earnings may be disproportionately small to the long-
term detriment of the shareholders. Almost complete discretion in the
managers as to when to declare a dividend is a salutary rule so long as
the managers are themselves substantial shareholders and chosen by
majority vote, conditions prevailing during the development of the
rule. But when, as in many gigantic modern corporations, the managers
own few shares and are self-perpetuating,7 the rule ceases to be merely
a method of preventing a rapacious minority from forcing the directors
to make ill-advised distributions of corporate assets. It becomes a de-
vice for building up economic empires for the managers by forcing the
shareholders continually to increase their investment in return for, at
most, additional pieces of paper euphemistically called "stock" divi-
dends.
Some states, seeking to curtail this common law discretion of cor-
porate managers as to distributing or withholding profits, have enacted
legislation entitling the shareholders to receive the net earnings of the
'corporation annually, after there has been set aside such a sum as the
shareholders may in good faith determine shall be retained as accumu-
lated surplus.8  The desirability of such laws is debatable. To the
extent that they put an end to uneconomic corporate "hoarding" and to
new pyramids of power on the part of management, they are com-
mendable. But to the extent that they prevent the development of ade-
quate reserves with which to cushion periods of unavoidable adversity.
or preclude self-financing of sound expansion projects, they are of
doubtful merit. A better solution would be to authorize the courts (or
preferablyi an administrative body), upon petition of an interested
shareholder, to order the annual distribution of net earnings unless
management could sustain the burden of justifying the retention in the
enterprise of all or part thereof.
The common law discretion of the management, however, may be
replaced, under certain circumstances, by a duty to declare dividends,
if earned. Such a duty may be imposed not only by legislative enact-
ment but also by specific provision in the corporate charter or even by
6. Morse v. Boston & Maine R. R., 263 Mass. 3o8, i6o N. E. 8g4 (t928).
7. See note x supra.
8. N. M. STAT. A-;-;. (Courtright, 1929) §32-56; N. C. CODE ANNz. (Michie,
1935) § 1178; LAWS oF PoRTo Rico (iq6) No. 24, § 9. A tax on undistributed cor-
porate surplus is another device for inducing a more liberal dividend policy on the part
of management.
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contract.9 But when the language relied upon as creating the duty
requires interpretation, the courts are not strongly inclined to construe
the duty into existence.10 Even where a corporation purports to "guar-
antee" the payment of stipulated dividends, some courts have declined
to compel the distribution of available profits to the holders of such
"guaranteed" shares. 1 It is well settled, however, that if the directors
do declare a dividend of available profits and this fact is communicated
to the shareholders, the distribution of this sum to the shareholders can
be compelled ;12 the directors' own conduct results in duty replacing
discretion.
So long as a given corporation has but one class, i. e. common
shares, out tanding, tile fact that the retaining or distributing of profits
lies within the discretion of management may cause little permanent
harm to those who have invested in such shares; if all goes well, they
will ultimately receive the profits in one form or another. But if the
corporation has two or more classes of shares outstanding, with vary-
ing rights to dividends incident to each, the manner in which manage-
ment exercises its discretion as to dividend payments may permanently
favor one class of shareholders at the expense of another. In such
instances the fact that management's dividend policy may not have been
motivated by special consideration for one class of shareholders will
not render the harm to another class any the less acute. It is with this
9. Burk v. Ottawa Gas & Electric Co., 87 Kan. 6, 123 Pac. 857 (1912) ; Lydia E.
Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Go~e, 2o N. E. (2d) 482 (Mass. 1939) ; Spear v. Rockland-
Rockport Lime Co., 113 Me. 285, 93 Atl. 754 (19j5); Park v. Grant Locomotive
Works, 40 N. J. Eq. 114, 3 Atl. 162 (1885) ; ii FLEMCHE, op. cit. supra note 5 at 805.
10. New York, Lake Erie & Western R. R. v. Nickals, I19 U. S. 296 ('886).
ii. Smith v. Southern Foundry Co., 166 Ky. 2o8, 179 S. W. 205 (1915); Kidd v.
Puritana Cereal Foods Co., 145 Mo. App. 502, 122 S. W. 784 (I9O9); Castorland Milk
and Cheese Co. v. Shantz, 179 N. Y. Supp. 131 (1919). Contra: Cratty v. Peoria Law
Library Ass'n, 219 IIl. 516, 76 N. E. 707 (i9o6).
12. Maloney v. Western Cooperage Co., 103 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939);
Flynn v. Haas Bros., 2o F. (2d) 510 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) ; Smith v. Taecker, 133 Cal.
App. 351, 24 P. (2d) 182 (1933) ; Beers v. Bridgeport Spring Co.. 42 Conn. I7 (1875);
Quinn v. Quinn Mfg. Co., 2o Mich. 664, 167 N. W. 898 (1918); Northwestern Marble
& Tile Co. v. Carlson, 116 Minn. 438, 133 N. W. 1014 (1912); McLaren v. Crescent
Planing Mill Co., 117 1\o. App. 40, 93 S. W. 819 (igo6) ; Billingham v. Gleason Mfg.
Co., 1o App. Div. 476, 91 N. Y. Supp. 1046 (1905), off'd, 18s N. Y. 571, 78 N. E. 1o99
(19o6), In re Given's Estate, 323 Pa. 456, i85 Ati. 778 (1936) ; BALLANTINF, op. Cit.
supra note 5 at 503; 1i FLTCHER, op. cit. supra note 5 at § 5322; Sm,'Ns, op. Cd.
supra note 5 at 399. See Note, Dcclaration of Dftidends-Stockholdcrs as Creditors
(1930) 28 Micn. L. REv. 914.
Several text writers state that a share dividend in contra-distinction to a cash divi-
dend may be effectively revoked; in support of this contention only two cases are cited,
neither of which is persuasive, 114mely, Terry v. Eagle Lock Co., 47 Conn. 141 (1879)
and Staats v. Biograph Co., 236 Fed. 454 (C. C. A. 2d, 196). On the other hand, in
the case of Dock v. Schlichter Jute Co., 167 Pa. 370. 31 Atl. 370 (1895), it was held
that an attempted revocation of a declaration of a dividend of the corporations's own
shares, which it had previously created and thereafter received in payment of a debt
owed to it, w as no defense to an action by a shareholder for his proportion of the divi-
dend. For an extended discussion of these cases and the underlying problem see Frey,
Is a Declaration of Subscription "Rights" Rcvocable? (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1163. See
also Note, Declaration and Rescission of Cash and Stock Dividends (1916) 6 COL L.
Rn.%- 599.
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competition for profits between shareholders having divergent rights
to dividends that this article is particularly concerned.
Corporations seldom declare dividends of all of the net earnings of
a given fiscal period immediately upon the termination of such period.
If there has been a past omission to distribute profits, this factor may
affect the respective rights of shareholders of various classes to divi-
dends subsequently declared. On the other hand, many important divi-
dend disputes are unrelated to any accumulation of earnings in bygone
years. In considering the conflicts between shareholders over dividends,
this article will segregate these two situations. Those problems which
may arise whether or not profits of earlier years have been undis-
tributed will be dealt with first; and with this analysis as a background,
the remainder of the paper will be devoted to an inquiry into the extent
to which the fact that certain past profits were not distributed as earned
may affect the subsequent rights of shareholders when dividends are
thereafter declared.
I. THE DIVIDEND INCIDENTS OF VARIOUS TYPES OF SHARES
The existence of a dividend preference is always a matter of spe-
cific provision in the articles of association. Unfortunately, however,
not infrequently the corporate articles omit to specify whether the hold-
ers of the preferred shares are to be limited to the amount of the pref-
erence or to be entitled to participate beyond the amount of the prefer-
ence if the corporate earnings warrant. Moreover, similar defective
draftsmanship may give rise to a dispute as to whether the preference
is cumulative or not, i. e. if the amount of the preference is not received
in a given year because not earned, does a right to this amount carry
over into succeeding years?
If, as all too frequently happens, a corporation's articles do not
unequivocally set forth the exact rights of the holders of each of its
authorized classes of shares, controversies such as those just indicated
are inevitable. Conflict between classes of shareholders over dividend
payments usually relate to matters which the parties, i. e. the promoters,
incorporators, or subscribers, or the directors, officers, shareholders or
underwriters, or their respective attorneys, did not anticipate. Conse-
quently, the problem is not to ascertain the non-existent "intent" of the
parties, but to determine what reasonable persons would have intended,
if the problem had been initially raised, in view of the circumstances
existing at the time of the creation of the shares.
The normal process whereby a corporation seeks to assemble funds,
other than by borrowing, is by the creation of voting common shares,
i. e. shares unpreferred and unlimited both as to dividend payments and
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capital distributions. When a corporation offers for subscription shares
having different attributes, there is always some underlying reason, usu-
ally to be found in a relation between the condition of the corporation
and the state of the prevailing money market.13 If the corporation is
earning only three percent on its capital and if this is low in relation to
prevailing money rates, the corporation will have to offer special induce-
ments to attract new capital from prospective shareholders. Such con-
ditions may result in the offering of fully participating, preferred
shares, i. e. shares which are on a parity with common as far as the
extent of dividend participation is concerned and which also have a first
claim on dividend distributions up to a stated amount. If, on the other
hand, the corporation is earning a return on its capital which is high in
relation to prevailing money rates, it can acquire such newv funds as it
may seek in one of several ways: by borrowing money at low interest
rates; or by offering additional common shares to its existing share-
holders at less than market value; or by offering additional common
shares, probably non-voting, to the public at their market value, which
in the case of par value of shares would be at a premium; or by offering
to the public a new class of shares having an aggregate of incidents
deemed to be inferior to those of common shares at the price asked.
For example, such a corporation might offer at $ioo per share, non-
voting shares of $ioo par value, having a non-cumulative, 6% prefer-
ence as to dividends and being limited thereto, and being subject to
redemption at par at the option of the corporation on and after a stipu-
lated date. The average investor in this type of share may prefer it to
a bond because of a higher yield; he may prefer it to an open market
purchase of common shares of the corporation because of the lower
price and the greater security in the event of an adverse turn in the
corporation's fortunes; and yet at the same price, i. e. $I00 per share,
he might prefer a common share in the corporation because of its
greater income potentialities.
Whenever there are preferred shares outstanding there must also
be common, for the preferred shareholders cannot be preferred without
someone over whom to be preferred; nor can shareholders be limited
as to dividends unless there are others who are entitled unlimitedly to
participate in further distributions of profits. It cannot be too strongly
emphasized that when disputes over dividend distributions arise between
shareholders of various classes (or even between shareholders of the
same class), the only rational basis for resolving such disputes is by
reference to the conditions present and prospective that induced the
13. DEvi ,G, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORIPORATIONS (3d ed. 1934) 43-67, 3o2-3x1,
io4o-io67.
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offer and the acceptance of those shares which are junior in time to the
other shares involved in the dispute.
Actually, in the opinions dealing with the question as to whether
preferred shares are participating or non-participating, cumulative or
not, one finds very little reference to the conditions which resulted in
the particular preferred issue. And yet the general attitude of the
courts in these cases indicates that such considerations might be given
great weight if adequately presented by counsel, for the courts empha-
size that the problem is primarily one of interpreting the contract of
the parties. For example, with reference to the matter of participation,
some courts, a majority, say that the preference must have been
intended in lieu of all further participation and that therefore the pre-
ferred are limited thereto as a maximum. 14 Other courts, a minority,
conclude that the parties must have intended all shares to have the same
incidents except in so far as specific differences are enumerated and
that therefore the preferred are, on a parity in this respect with com-
mon, unlimited as to dividends. 15 The financial circumstances accom-
panying the issue ought to shed important light on this question of what
the parties would have intended if they had anticipated the problem.
With almost complete unanimity the courts have held that, where
the articles are silent, preferred shares are cumulative. 16 The underly-
ing thought seems to be that if the common shareholders concede that
another class is to have a stipulated preference as to dividends, the com-
mon are in effect agreeing that the fund thereafter available for divi-
dends shall not be diminished by dividends to themselves, until the pre-
ferred have received the amount of their preference for each year of
their existence. And this conclusion will be reached, whether the prob-
_4. Niles v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co., 202 Fed. 141 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913); Tennant
v. Epstein, 356 Ill. 26, z89 N. E. 864 0934) ; Stone v. U. S. Envelope Co., 9ig Me. 394,
III AtI. 536 (1920) ; James F. Powers Foundry Co. v. Miller, 166 Md. 59o, 171 AtL
842 (x934) ; Scott v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 93 Md. 475, 49 Atl. 327 (io) ; Murphy
v. Richardson Dry Goods Co., 326 Mo. 1, 31 S. W. (2d) 72 (1930); Duwelius v.
Champion Fibre Co., 25 Ohio N. P. (.;. s.) 1o7 (1924); Shimmon v. Nat'l Screw and
Tack Co., z8 Ohio N. P. (x. s.) 569 (ig16). See Harno, Rights of Common and Pre-
Ierred Stockholders to Share in Surphs (1925) 20 ILL. L. RE'. 288.
z5- Englander v. Osborne, 26i Pa. 366, 104 Atl. 614 (1918) ; Sterling v. Watson,
241 Pa. xo, 88 Adt. 297 (1913) ; Sternberg v. Brock, 225 Pa. 279, 74 Ati. 116 (19o9) ;
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 215 Pa. 6Io, 84 Atl. 829 (i9o6). See also
Lyman v. Southern R. R., 149 Va. 274, 14r S. E. 240 (1928). See Note, Conflicting
Claims of Preferred and Common Shareholders With Respect to Corporate "Profits"
(1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 466.
i6. Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v. Van Dyk & Reeves, Inc., 8 F. (2d) 716, 720 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1925) ; Warburton v. John Wanamaker, Philadelphia, 329 Pa. 5, 196 Ati. So6
(1938); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 215 Pa. 61o, 64 Atl. 829
(i906) ; BALLATINE, Op. cit. stpra note 5 at 528; 12 FLETcHER, op. cit. supra note 5
at 188. Contra: Elkins v. Camden, etc., R. R., 36 N. J. Eq. 233 (1882). A "guaran-
tee" of dividends on preferred shares has uniformly been held to have the effect of mak-
ing the dividend preference cumulative. Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31 'Mich. 76 (1875) ;
Boardman v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R., 84 N. Y. 157 (188) ; Prouty v. Michigan, etc.,
R. R. Co., i Hun (N. Y.) 655 (1874).
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lem arises while the corporation is a going concern or when it is in
process of liquidation.17
Incidentally, it is interesting to note that if preferred shares are
cumulative, either as a result of express stipulation or judicial construc-
tion, the courts are strongly inclined to protect the interests of such
shareholders in accumulated, unpaid, back dividends. For example,
where such shares are eliminated by a statutory reduction of capital
stock, a right to the amount of the back dividends has been held never-.
theless to survive.- And where attempts have been made to wipe out
rights to accrued dividends by amending the articles, the courts have
been more alert to invalidate such amendments than any others affect-
ing the incidents of a particular class of shares.' On final dissolution
of a corporation, the common shareholders have at times contended
that the right to accrued back dividends on cumulative preferred shares
is gone, either on the theory that the right is a right to dividends and
that dividends can be paid only by a going concern and not by one in
the process of liquidation, or that there is no surplus and the right is
merely to receive a preference in the distribution of profits. But here,
too, the courts have favored the holders of the cumulative shares, and
the majority have held that such shareholders are entitled to the amount
17. Fawkes v. Farm Lands Inv. Co., x1 Cal. App. 374, 297 Pac. 47 (1911);
Pennsylvania Co. v. Cox, 199 At. 67r (Del. Ch. x938); Garrett v. Edge Moor Iron
Co., '94 At. i5 (Del. Ch. 1937); Pennington v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction
Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 394, 155 Atl. 514 (1931) ; Johnson v. Johnson & Briggs, 138 Va. 487,
122 S. E. ioo (1924); Drewry-Hughes Co. v. Throckmorton, z2o Va. 859, 92 S. E. 818
(1917); cf. to the same effect, Wilson v. Laconia Car Co., 275 Mass. 435, 176 N. E.
775 (i93x). Contra: Michael v. Cagey-Caguas Tobacco Co., i9O App. Div. 6x8, z8o
N. Y. Supp. 532 (i92o); Powell v. Craddock-Terry Co., '75 Va. 146, 7 S. E. (2d)
143 (1940).
i& Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., x84 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13 (i9o6).
1g. Bay Newfoundland Co., Ltd. v. Wilson & Co., 4 A. (2d) 668 (Del. Ch. 1939);
Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson, i97 At. 489 (Del. 1937) ; Keller v. Wilson
& Co., i9O Atl. iz5 (Del. 1936) ; Morris v. American Public Utilities Co, 14 Del. Ch.
136, 122 Atl. 696 (1923); Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine
Co., xoi N. J. Eq. 554, 139 Atl. so (i927); Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 214
N. C. 8o6, 2oo S. E. 9o6 (1939) ; Harbine v. Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 6x Ohio App.
z, 22 N. E. (2d) 281 (1939). See, to the same effect, as to consolidation, Colgate v.
U. S. Leather Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 72, 62 Atl. 657 (19o7), reV'd on other grounds, 75 N. J.
Eq. 229, 72 Atl. 126 (igog). That the shareholder's right may be lost through laches,
see Frank v. Wilson & Co., 9 A. (2d) 82 (Del. Ch. 1939) ; Romer v. Porcelain Prod-
ucts, 2 A. (2d) 75 (Del. Ch. 1938). Contra: Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65
F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 673 (1933); McGuillen v.
National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1939). See, to the same effect,
as to a merger, Federal United Corp. v. Havender, ii A. (2d) 331 (Del. 194o).
It has been held that, at a time when there are accumulated unpaid dividends on a
given class of preferred shares, the corporation may create a new class of prior pre-
ferred shares (without cancelling the old preferred or their accrued dividends) and
may thereafter pay dividends on the new preferred before paying the back dividends
on the old, cumulative preferred, at least if the dividends on the new preferred are
limited to subsequent earnings and do not come out of past surplus: Blumenthal v. Di
Giorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. App. (2d) ir, 85 P. (2d) 58o (1938); Shanik v. White
Sewing Machine Corp., 15 A. (2d) x69 (Del. Ch. 1940) ; Thomas v. Laconia Car Co,
251 Mass. 529, 146 N. E. 775 (1925) ; Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio 567,- 15 N. E.
(2d) i7 (1938) ; Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. C.
R. I. 1929). See also Note (i94i) 89 U. oF PA. L. REX 789, infra, in this issue.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE DIVIDENDS
of the accumulated dividends, dissolution or no dissolution, before the
common receive anything, even if this sum has to come out of the
capital which the common originally contributed to the enterprise. 20
Some of the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph reflect a
strange notion that crops up from time to time even with respect to
corporations that are active, going concerns, viz. that increases in the
amount of the net assets, not resulting from payment for shares, may
be realized and yet not be available for dividend purposes, despite the
absence of any previous capital impairment. This delusion may result
from familiarity with certain phases of English corporation law. There
the term "capital" is by some used not to refer to a figure indicating
the amount (loosely speaking) which the shareholders have subscribed
for their shares, but to the land or other property which the corporation
acquires with such sum; 21 and if the land or other "capital" appreciates
in value, this is regarded as a "capital" increase and subject to eventual
distribution in accordance with the rules for distributing "capital".
Hence, in England, it makes some sense to indicate that a share, pre-
ferred as to capital, may be either limited to the amount of the prefer-
ence or entitled to further participation in capital distributions. But
in the United States the prevailing doctrine is that all of the net assets,
in excess of the amount of the shareholders' subscriptions allocated to
capital, are profits, and as such subject upon eventual distribution to
the rules relating to dividends. 22 Where not modified by statute, this
is true even as to paid-in (or "capital") surplus. 23 And the same rules
should operate whether the fund is distributed during the life of the
corporation or upon final liquidation.
Consider this illustration. Corporation C issues I,ooo common
shares, and i,ooo shares preferred as to dividends to the extent of $6
per share and limited thereto, but in other respects on a parity with the
common. For each share Corporation C receives $Ioo, the par value.
Of the $200,000 thus received, Corporation C invests $iooooo in real
property. During its first fiscal year (i) the corporation has net earn-
ings from operations of $ioooo, (2) it receives a gift of $io,ooo, and
(3) the directors sell a portion of the corporation's real property in
excess of its needs for a profit of $2o,ooo. If at the end of the year
the directors were to declare a dividend of $6 per share on the preferred
2o. The cases are set forth in note x6 supra.
21. Ammonia Soda Co. v. Chamberlain [igi8] x Ch. 266; Verner v. General &
Comm'l Investment Trust [18941 2 Ch. 239, 265. See RF.ITm, PRoFiTS, DmMD Ds A"W
THE LAv (926) 71-72.
22. 11 FLETcHEn, Cy c.oPErA oF ComRo.ArioNs (1932) § 5335.
23. Benas v. Title Guaranty Trust Co., 216 Mo. App. 53, 267 S. W. 28 (1924);
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Union Pacific R. R., 2r2 N. Y. 36o, zo6 N. E. 92
(1914); Note, Declaration of Dizqdends from Paid-in Surplus (1931) 3 COL. L REV.
844; RXFEn, of'. cit. supra n. 21, c. XIX. But see Merchants' & Insurers' Reporting
Co. v. Schroeder, 39 Cal. App. 26, 178 Pac. 54o (xgx8).
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and $34 per share on the common, no right of the preferred would
be violated. In short, despite the fact that the preferred are identical
with the common except for the preference and limitation as to divi-
dends, everything that the corporation gains beyond the dividend
requirements on the preferred belongs to the common whether it be
earned from the conduct of the enterprise, or derived from unearned
appreciation in asset values, from gifts, etc. And, as will be more
fully developed later in this paper,2 4 the fact that such gains are per-
mitted to accumulate ought not adversely to affect the right of the
common to receive the amount in question whenever distributed,
whether this be during the life of the corporation or upon dissolution.
The Effect of Date of Issue Upon Dividend Claims
Within a single class of shares, each share normally entitles the
holder to an equal proportion of the profits, even though the shares may
have been created at different times. 25 Let us suppose that Corporation
C is formed with an authorized capital stock of 2,000 common shares
of $Ioo par value each and that at its inception it issues at par i,ooo of
such shares. During the first year of its existence it has net earnings
of $2,ooo. At the end of this year it accepts public subscriptions to
the remaining i,ooo authorized common shares. During the second
year the net earnings are $4,000. If at the end of the second year the
directors were to declare a $3 dividend on each of the zooo shares
outstanding, the rights of the holders of the I,ooo shares first issued
(if, indeed, they could all be identified) would not-be violated despite
the fact that one-third of the net earnings had occurred during a period
when they were the sole shareholders. The reason is that the law
assumes, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, that when the
second L,ooo shares was issued to outsiders, the best price obtainable
was received by the corporation.26  Since, in this hypothetical case, the
corporation then had a surplus of $2 a share, the new shares would
normally be issued at a premium of substantially $2 per share above
par in order to equalize the interests of the old and the new shareholders
in surplus; and if the corporation was not able to obtain such a pre-
mium, this would indicate that the financial market considered the old
shareholders as having already lost some of their original investment
In other words, if the subscription price is adequate, the holder of each
new share contributes to the corporate enterprise as much as the holder
of each old share is deemed to have therein at that time, and if there
24. See infra at 750 et seq.
25. STnE.VES, op. cit. mipra note 5, at 511.
26. The rule has been applied even to shares obtained by exercising a privilege of
converting bonds into shares very shortly before the declaration of the dividend; see
Jones v. Terre Haute & Richmond R. R. Co., 57 N. Y. 196 (1874).
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* is an existing surplus, this fact will be reflected in the price. If the
subscription price is less than the market value, then the shares should
be offered exclusively to the existing shareholders.
2?
If there are only common shares outstanding, and new common
shares are offered proportionately to the present shareholders at par;,
although there is a then existing surplus, no injustice results as each
shareholder has an opportunity to gain in book value on.his new shares
just what he loses in book value on his old; and if a given shareholder
elects not to subscribe to his proportion of the new shares, he can
recover for his loss of surplus on his old shares by selling his rights to
subscribe to the new shares. For example, if at a time when Corpora-
tion C has outstanding i,ooo shares of $IOO par value each and a sur-
plus of $50,000 (i. e. $50 per share), it creates another i,ooo shares at
par, the surplus thereby becomes $25 per share, old and new. Each old
shareholder who exercises his right to subscribe proportionately to the
new shares gains a $25 interest in surplus on his new shares and loses
a like interest on his old; and if he does not want more shares, he can
normally compensate for the decrease in the amount of surplus to which
his old shares will be entitled by selling his right to subscribe to the
new shares for substantially that amount, thereby obtaining in cash the
amount by which his right to future dividends has been diminished.
Although within a given class of shares the different dates of issue
of various shares do not normally affect their respective rights to divi-
dends, in the case of cumulative preferred shares dividend rights may
be proportionate to the length of time that each of such shares has been
outstanding. For example: Corporation C's authorized capital stock
consists in part of 3,ooo shares of $ioo par value each, having a
cumulative preference as to dividends of $6 per share. At its inception
the corporation issues I,OOO of these shares at par. During the first
year the corporation operates without profit or loss. At the end of the
first year the corporation issues at par another iooO of these shares.
During the second year the corporation again has no net earnings. At
the end of the second year the corporation issues the third i,ooo of
these shares at par. During the third year the corporation has net
earnings of $3oooo, all of which the directors are willing to distribute
among the holders of the cumulative preferred shares. How should
this fund be divided? There are four plausible bases. First, each
share should have the same dividend rights as every other share of this
class, and, just as in the case of common shares, the duration of exist-
ence should be disregarded; 28 under this theory each share would be
27. See RESTATrTE.'CT, BUSI.ESS ASSOCIATIONS (Tent. Draft No. x. 1928) § 19.
2& In Holland v. National Automotive Fibres, x94 At. 124 (Del. Ch. 1937), off'd,
2 Atl. (2d) i24 (Del. Ch. 1938), it was held that dividends on cumulative shares do
not begin to accumulate until the date of issuance.
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allotted $Io. Second, the dividends accumulated on the first I,OOO
shares being $i8 per share, on the second i,ooo $12 per share, and on
the third i,ooo $6 per share, or $36,ooo in all, the holders of the first
i,ooo shares should get 1%6 of the $30,oo0, or $i5 per share, the
holders of the second i,ooo shares 1%6 or $io per share, and the holder
of the third i,ooo shares %; or $5 per share. Third, the holders of
the first i,ooo should get $6 per share, or $6,ooo, for the first year's
dividends; the holders of the first i,ooo and of the second i,ooo should
each get $6 per share, or $i2,ooo, for the second year's dividends; this
would leave $i2,ooo out of the $30,000 which should be divided equally
for the third year among each of the 3,000 shares, 1'. e. $4 per share;
in this way each of the first i,ooo shares would receive $I6, each of the
second i,ooo, $io and each of the third $i ,ooo, $4. Fourth, the dividends
having been earned during the third year, the dividends for that year
should be paid first; this would require $6 per share, or $i8,ooo; the
dividends for the second year should next be paid; this would consume
the remaining $12,ooo, and would leave $6 per share still owing on the
first i,ooo shares, with the other shares paid in full; or the remaining
$12,ooo might be distributed % to the holders of the first iooo shares
and % to the holders of the second i,ooo shares, in which event the
first I,ooo would receive $14 per share, the second i,ooo, $io per share,
and the third i,ooo, $6 per share.
No court of record has apparently as yet been confronted with this
problem, and there seems to be no "common understanding" 29 in the
commercial world as to its solution. The second of the foregoing sug-
gestions appeals to the present writer as the fairest, for it would seem
reasonable to presume that the capital paid to the corporation by each
group of shares has contributed to the eventual profits of the corpora-
tion in proportion to the length of time that the corporation has had the
use of such capital. No surplus having been accumulated, it seems
unlikely that the price obtainable for the later issues will be influenced
in any way save downward by the fact that unpaid and unearned divi-
dends have already accrued on other shares of the same class. There-
fore the holders of the later shares cannot claim dividend parity with
the earlier shareholders on the basis of any equalization increment in
the subscription price paid by them.
In order to make it practical to keep track of the respective divi-
dend claims of cumulative shares of a single class issued at varying
times, each block of shares should when issued be earmarked as a des-
ignated series. Moreover, again in the interests of practicality, all such
. See the expression of Mr. Justice Holmes in Wabash Ry. Co. v. Barclay, 28o
U . I97, 203 (1930).
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shares issued in a given fiscal year should be of the same series, and
should entitle the holders thereof to the same dividend rights, despite
the fact that the shares may have been outstanding for varying periods
within the fiscal year.
A problem closely related to that last considered arises when a
corporation issues two or more classes of cumulative preferred shares
without designating either as prior to the other. For instance, the only
difference between the two classes may be as to the amount of dividend
preference; or one class may be voting, or participating as to dividends,
or preferred as to capital, and the other not. In this event the shares
should be treated as if they were merely various series of the same class,
and the respective cumulative rights of each class should depend on the
duration of its existence and the amount of its dividend preference.
For example: Corporation C at its inception issues i,ooo common
shares and i,ooo $6 cumulative preferred shares; there are no net earn-
ings during the first year; at the beginning of the second year Corpo-
ration C issues i,ooo $8 cumulative preferred shares; during the second
year the net earnings are $i5,0oo, all of which the directors desire to
distribute among the preferred shareholders. The dividends accumu-
lated on the $6 preferred being $12,ooo, and on the $8 preferred $8,ooo.
or $2o,ooo in all, the holders of the $6 preferred should get '%o of the
$15,ooo, or $9 per share, and the holders of the $8 preferred should get
%o, or $6 per share. This leaves unpaid back dividends or $3 per share
on the $6 preferred and $2 per share on the $8 preferred, which must
be added to future accruals in determining the respective rights of each
class to subsequent net earnings.
But if, of two classes of preferred shares outstanding, one is cumu-
lative and the other non-cumulative and neither is designated as prior,
a different result should be reached. For example: Corporation C at
its inception issues i,ooo common shares and i,ooo $6 non-cumulative
preferred shares; at the beginning of the second year the corporation
issues i,ooo $6 cumulative preferred shares; there are no net earnings
during the first two years but during the third year the net earnings
are $12,ooo. If the basis previously suggested as to shares of a single
class, or of more than one class all of which are cumulative, were to be
adopted for the apportionment of this $12,000, the result would be as
follows: there having been no earnings during the first two years, the
non-cumulative preferred have a "credit" of only $6,ooo for the third
year; the cumulative preferred have a claim to $12,ooo for the twoyears
of their existence; a total of $I8,ooo. So the non-cumulative would re-
ceive /18 of the $12,ooo, or $4 per share, and the cumulative 1!Y8 or
$8 per share. But during the second year of the corporation's existence
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there accrued in favor of the cumulative preferred a dividend right of
$6,ooo; this right ought to be accorded priority over any subsequent
dividend credit that may develop with respect to non-cumulative pre-
ferred shares, i. e. shares of a different class. Hence $6,ooo of the
$12,ooo should first be assigned to the back dividends on the cumulative
preferred, and the remaining $6,ooo should be divided equally between
them, leaving the cumblative preferred (but not the non-cumulative)
with a claim of $3 per share against future earnings.
If a corporation has outstanding two classes of shares, common
shares and shares which have a dividend preference of $6 per share
and full participation thereafter, disputes may arise as to the extensive-
ness of the "participation" to which the holders of the preferred shares
are entitled. It has been contended that, if the net earnings of a given
fiscal year are to be distributed, the holder of each preferred share
should first receive $6 and should thereafter share equally with the
holder of each common share in the remainder. But. in the absence of
explicit language in the articles justifying a different result, the more
general conclusion has been that the preference is no more than a first
claim on the net earnings, and that therefore after the holder of each
preferred share has received the full amount of his preference, -the
holder of each common share is entitled to a like amount, and then only
are the remaining net assets subject to pro rata distribution between the
common and the participating preferred.3 0
If there are two classes of participating preferred shares, e. g. $6
and $7, as well as common shares outstanding, to how much are the
common shares entitled before the preferred shares begin to participate
in any further distribution of net earnings? There is a general rule,
subject however to various exceptions, 1 to the effect that shares of all
classes have similar attributes unless specific differences are set forth
in the articles of association. If this rule be applied, the answer is not
difficult. First the preferred shares would receive $6 and $7 respec-
tively; then the common shares would be entitled to the balance of the
net earnings up to $6 per share; next the $6 preferred and the common
would each be entitled to an additional dollar per share if the net earn-
30. 12 FLETCHm, op. cit. supra n. 5, § c448; Bailey v. Hannibal, etc., R. R., 17
Wall. 96 (U. S. z873). See Christ, Right of Holders of Preferred Stock to Participate
in the Distribution of Profits (1929) 27 MIcff. L. REv. 73z, 748.
31. E. g., where the articles are silent on the point, preferred shares are generally
held to be cumulative (see note 16 supra), but no element of dividend cumulation is
incident to common shares; Englander v. Osborne, 261 Pa. 366, 104 Aft. 614 (1918) ;
and Lockwood v. General Abrasive Co., 21o App. Div. 141, 205 N. Y. Supp. 511 (1924),
aff'd, 24o N. Y. 592, 148 N. E. 719 (1925) ; also most courts hold that where the articles
do nof specify whether preferred shares may participate in dividends beyond the amount
of the preference, such shares are limited to the designated preference (see note 14
supra), although there is no limit to the dividend participation of common shares.
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ings were sufficient; and finally any remaining net earnings would be
subject to pro rata distribution between all three classes.
Dividcnd Claims in a Wasting Assets Corporation
Conflicts among preferred and common shareholders over divi-
dends sometimes arise out of the fact that their corporation was
formed to exploit a wasting asset, such as a patent. or a mine, or an oil
well. The major asset of such a corporation is inevitably used up as
a result of the conduct of the enterprise: the patent expires; the mine
or the well is depleted. This fact has caused some courts to sanction a
departure from the normal method of determining the fund available
for dividends. Such courts permit the profits or net earnings of these
corporations to be calculated without any allowance for the annual
depletion of the wasting asset in which the major part of the corpo-
ration's capital is invested.3' If the net earnings so calculated are
periodically distributed to the shareholders in the form of dividends, a
progressive capital impairment inevitably results. When the corpora-
tion has but one class of shareholders (necessarily common) and no
funded debt, no great hardship may result from such a rule, especially
if the shareholders are informed as to the portion of the dividends
received that really represents a return of capital. But if the corpora-
tion has outstanding preferred shares as well as common, this variation
from the normal accounting practice may be a distinct detriment to the
preferred.38 As the capital becomes impaired, the ability of the cor-
poration to earn the amount of any dividend preference will progres-
sively decrease. And if the preferred have a capital preference upon
eventual liquidation, and are limited as to dividends to a designated
amount, the progressive capital impairment resulting from the distri-
bution to the common of the entire balance of the net earnings, so
computed, will eventually cause the capital preference to be worthless,
as there will be virtually nothing left upon dissolution out of which to
honor the agreed capital preference. It is fatuous to argue that when
persons subscribe for preferred shares in a wasting assets corporation,
they impliedly agree that the nature of the enterprise warrants a dis-
regard of depletion in determining the fund upon which the otherwise
established dividend rules shall operate. The assets of all corporations
are depleted--depreciate-through use. The very fact that the pre-
ferred shareholders have bargained for a preference as to dividends or
32. Mellon v. Mississippi Wire Glass CO., 77 N. J. Eq. 498, 78 At. 710 (191o);
i FurcCxEx, op. cit. supra note 5, § 5347.
33. Federal Mining & Smelting Co. v. Vittenberg, z5 Del. Ch. 4o9, z38 AtL 347
(1927) ; but see Wittenberg v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co., 15 Del. Ch. 35t, 138
AtL 352 (1927).
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capital (or both) belies the notion that they have consented to distri-
butions to the common shareholders which will either undermine or
destroy their preference. For these reasons, if a wasting assets corpo-
ration has preferred shares outstanding, it should be required, in deter-
mining the fund available for dividends, to make the same allowances for
depletion as if it were not a wasting assets enterprise. This is all the
more true if the corporation was formed not to exploit a single specified
property but to engage, for example, in a general mining business. In
such case the corporation should keep its capital intact by accumulating
cash or other assets so as to acquire other mining property when the
original mine is exhausted.84
This concludes a consideration of the major disputes that may
arise between shareholders when the management of their corporation
elects to distribute by way of cash dividends the profits of a given fiscal
period at the conclusion of that period. We turn now to the further
complications which may arise when management, having elected to
accumulate rather than distribute profits for a certain period, subse-
quently determines to declare a dividend.
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF DIVIDEND CREDIT
The author firmly believes that, in order to insure equitable treat-
ment of all classes of shareholders, management should be required to
abide by the following rule whenever a dividend is proposed subse-
quent to any prior omission to distribute profits of an earlier fiscal
period: in the absence of an unequivocal provision of the applicable
statutes, articles, by-laws or resolutions, the respective rights of the
various classes of shareholders to the proposed dividend should be
determined by reference to what their respective rights would have
been to an amount equal to the fund about to be distributed, if all the
profits of the corporation had been declared as dividends at the end of
each fiscal period in which such profits were acquired.
While it is not believed that the application of this rule is limited
to problems concerning non-cumulative preferred shares, it is of
especial importance in relation to such shares. As to cumulative
preferred shares, the law is clear: if the amount of the dividend prefer-
ence for a given year is not paid, the right to receive this amount before
the common receive any dividends is not gone but is carried over into
subsequent years and added to the preferred rights arising in those
years, and this accumulation results without regard to whether there
have been past earnings out of which management might have elected
to pay the preferred dividends or whether the past earnings have been
34- (1926) 40 HAR V. L. REV. 318.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE DIVIDENDS
insufficient to meet the amount of the dividend preference. 85 The state-
ment that shares preferred as to dividends are non-cumulative at first
blush suggests that with respect to the feature of cumulation they are the
exact opposite of cumulative preferred shares; it would secm to indicate
that if a dividend to the amount of the preference for a given year is
in fact not declared to such non-cumulative shares, the right to receive
this amount of dividends in priority to dividends upon the common
shares is gone forever, whether or not funds were lawfully available
for the unpaid preferred dividend, had management elected to distribute
them. No case has squarely adopted this extreme connotation of the
term "non-cumulative". Some have rejected it, while others have to a
limited extent approved it.
When shares, described by the parties as preferred but non-
cumulative as to dividends, are created, whatever else they may have
had in mind, it is incredible that either the offering party or the accept-
ing party intended that if the corporation thereafter experienced in
each of an unbroken number of years a profit more than enough to pay
the amount of the preferred dividends, all of these profits might law-
fully be paid to the holders of the common shares. And yet this is pre-
cisely what may happen if the term "non-cumulative" is accepted as the
complete negation of "cumulative". Corporation X at its inception cre-
ates at par I,ooo common shares of $xoo par value each. Some years
later Corporation X creates at par i,ooo shares of $Ioo par value each,
entitling the holders to a non-cumulative preference as to dividends of
$6 per share. For each of the five years thereafter the net earnings of
the corporation are $12,ooo, but management elects to declare no divi-
dends during this period. During the sixth year the earnings are also
$12,ooo and at the end of that year, management declares a dividend of
$6 per share on the preferred and $66 per share on the common. When
the preferred protest, they are informed by management that they have
no ground for complaint since they are receiving the amount of their
dividend preference for the current year, and all claims to dividends for
the preceding years are gone forever since no dividends were declared
and their shares are "non-cumulative". If this be a legally correct
response, then the law has left open a tremendous loophole through
which management can favor one class of shareholders at the expense
of another.
The most thoroughgoing consideration of the respective rights of
non-cumulative preferred shares and of common shares to dividend dis-
35. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. West End Chemical Co., 37
Cal. App. (2d) 685, 1oo P. (2d) 318 (I94o) ; Allied 'Magnet Wire Corp. v. Tuttle, 199
Ind. 166, i54 N. E. 480 (1926); Lockwood v. General Abrasive Co., 21o App. Div. 141,
143, 2o5 N. Y. Supp. 51i (1924) ; Ir FLETCHER, op. cit. mtpra n. 5 at 777; STvEs,
op. cit. Pra n. 5 at 410.
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tributions is to be found in a series of decisions by the New Jersey
judiciary. In successive cases involving the shareholders of the United
States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., the court held: (i) that in a
year in which there were no current net earnings out of which current
dividend preferences might be paid, management was entitled to pay
from surplus a dividend to the holders of non-cumulative preferred
shares to an amount equal to net earnings which might have been dis-
tributed to them in prior years; 36 (2) that management might in a
given year pay to the non-cumulative, non-participating preferred share-
holders, in addition to the amount of their preference for that year, an
amount representing earned but unpaid dividends on their shares for a
preceding year; 3' and (3) that even when the non-cumulative preferred
have received the amount of their preference from the net earnings of a
given year, management may not pay a dividend to the common share-
holders out of the remaining net earnings for the same year, while
amounts equal to earned dividends from prior years remain unpaid on
the non-cumulative preferred shares.38 In two subsequent cases,3 '
however, it has been held that a non-cumulative preferred shareholder
may not restrain the distribution to junior shareholders of an amount
equal to surplus earned in previous years during which dividends might
have been, but were not, declared or paid upon the non-cumulative pre-
ferred shares.
The judicial opinions dealing with these controversies between
holders of non-cumulative preferred shares and holders of common or
other junior shares over the current distribution of sums equivalent to
prior net earnings often seek support for their diverse rulings in some
particular fact such as whether or not the past net earnings had been
utilized by the corporation for "permanent improvements", 0 or whether
or not the directors held substantial blocks of the junior shares. 41 But
36. Bassett v. U. S. Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 539, 73 AtL 514
(19o9) ; accord, Collins v. Portland Electric Power Co., 12 F. (2d) 671 (C. C. A. 9th,
1926). For an extensive analysis of the New Jersey decisions and kindred "dividend
credit" problems, see BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF Coa.oATIox FINANCE (1928)
cbs. V and VI.
37. Moran v. U. S. Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 388, 123 AtL 546
(1924), aff'd, 96 N. J. Eq. 698, 126 Atd. 329 (1924) ; accord, Wood v. Gary, 47 Hun 550
(N. Y. i888), affd, i24 N. Y. 83. 26 N. E. 33&
38. Day v. U. S. Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 96 N. J. Eq. 736, I26 AtL 3o2
(1924). Contra: Norwich Water Co. v. Southern R. R., ii VA. L REG. 203 (Rich-
mond City Ct. 1925).
39. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Barclay, 280 U. S. 197 (i93o), rez"g, Barclay v. Wabash
Ry. Co., 30 F. (2d) 26o (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) ; Joslin v. Boston & Maine Ry., 274 Mass.
551, 175 N. E. 156 (1931).
40. See Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion in Wabash Ry. Co. v. Barclay, 28o U. S. 197
(1930). and the dissenting opinion of Judge Hand in Barclay v. Wabash Ry. Co, 30
F. (2d) 26o, 267 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
4!. Although Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion in the Wabash case was astonishingly
brief, he did take occasion to mention that "the control of the Wabash seems to have
been in Class A, the class to which the plaintiffs belong. . . ." 280 U. S. 197, 203
(930).
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such considerations are of little relevance. Will a right of the pre-
ferred shareholders be violated by the proposed dividend payment to
the common shareholders? This is the primary issue. Such a right,
if it exists, is violated not when the directors elect to transform funds
available for dividends on the preferred shares into fixed or other
assets, but when the directors subsequently determine that the interests
of the corporation do now warrant a dividend to the common share-
holders. And if such a right exists, the detriment to the preferred
shareholders from its violation will be just as greatr whether the direc-
tors act in good faith or not. The particular language of applicable
statutes or provisions of the articles of incorporation is also stressed by
the opinions in these cases. But the controversies arise for the very
reason that the language of neither the statute nor the charter is explicit.
The pretense that the words used require one rather than another of dis-
puted interpretations tends to conceal the principle or policy which really
underlies the selection of the "interpretation" adopted.
The majority opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the case
of Barclay v, Wabash Railway Co.,42 while recognizing that the direc-
tors have almost absolute discretion as to when earnings shall be dis-
tributed as dividends, suggested that nevertheless the non-cumulative
preferred shareholders acquired a "dividend credit" Is in the annual
undistributed earnings up to the amount of their preference. This con-
cept affects not when earnings shall be distributed, but to whom, once
a decision has been reached to distribute them. The majority of com-
mentators upon the non-cumulative dividend cases have approved the
underlying theory of the Circuit Court in the I~abash case.44  Is it
possible that herein is to be found a principle of general application to
all controversies between classes of shareholders over dividend dis-
tributions, of which the non-cumulative cases are but a specific applica-
tion? Should the rights of shareholders of whatever class to a declared
dividend be determined by reference to their respective, rights to an
amount equal to the fund about to be distributed, if dividends of all the
earnings of the corporation had been declared at the end of each fiscal
period in which earned? Is such a dividend credit theory feasible?
To what extent is it supported by the decided cases?
Before proceeding with a further consideration of these questions,
some preliminary matters should be clarified. In the first place, although
42. Note 39 supra.
43. "Preferred A stock received a dividend credit to the -extent of the earnings
each year, not to exceed 5 per cent. It secured no dividend credit whatever in any year
where there were no earnings." Barclay v. Wabash Ry. Co., 3o F. (2d) 260, 262 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1929).
44. See, e. g., BmL, op. cit. supra note 36, at 92-110; Hicks, The Rights of Non-
Cumulathe Preferred Stock-A Doubtful Deciion of the U. S. Supreme Court (1931)
5 TE.MP. L. Q. 538; Lattin, Is Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock in Fact Prcferred?
(1930) 25 Iri. L. REv. 14&
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a corporation must have profits or net earnings in order to be in a posi-
tion lawfully to declare a cash dividend, such profits or net earnings
need not exist among its assets in the form of cash. For example, a
corporation may, have a surplus of say $5o,ooo without having any
cash. If it desires to pay a cash dividend of $5o,ooo, it may acquire the
necessary funds either by selling assets of that value or by borrowing
such a sum. In the latter event the corporation's assets and liabilities
will each be increased by a like amount, the amount of the surplus will
consequently remain unchanged, and the borrowed cash will be'avail-
able for dividend purposes. Therefore, the fact that the corporation
may have accumulated its past profits or net earnings in the form of
fixed or current assets other than cash should have no bearing upon
the respective rights of shareholders to cash dividends subsequently
declared.
Furthermore, it is faulty to conceive of a given dividend declara-
tion as being a proposed distribution of the profits of a particular fiscal
period. If the directors purport to declare at the end of 194o a dividend
of the profits of 1938,45 they are in fact merely stating that they now
propose to reduce the assets of the corporation by distributing to the
shareholders an amount equal to the 1938 profits. The 1938 profits
have become merged in the general assets of the corporation and are
in no way segregated or ear-marked. The rights of shareholders of
various classes may be contingent on the fact that there were undis-
tributed net earnings in a given year, but the respective rights of the
shareholders whenever a dividend is thereafter declared will not be
affected by the fact that the directors measure the amount of such divi-
dend by reference to the net earnings of a designated year.
Thus far the application of the principle of dividend credit has
been related only to non-cumulative preferred shares. The extent to
which this principle is relevant not only to such shares but also to com-
mon shares as well as other types of preferred shares may best be indi-
cated by a series of illustrative cases.
Illustration i. At its inception Corporation C issues i,ooo com-
mon shares and I,ooo 6% non-cumulative preferred shares, all of a
par value of $ioo each. At the end of the first year of its existence
Corporation C has no funds lawfully available for dividends. At the
end of its second year Corporation C has $12.ooo lawfully available
for dividends. 4" There having been no profits or earnings during the
45. For an illustration of such a dividend declaration see Collins v. Portland Elec-
tric Co., 12 F. (2d) 671 (C. C. A. 9th, x926).
46. Some jurisdictions permit dividends to be paid from the net earnings of each
fiscal year even though there may be a continuing capital impairment; most states limit
dividends to surplus and thus properly forbid distributions to shareholders if a deficit
exists or would be caused thereby.
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first year, the holders of the preferred shares have no right to dividends
with respect to that year. If the directors determine to distribute the
$i2,ooo to the shareholders at the end of the second year, the holders
of the non-cumulative preferred are entitled to $6 per share first, and
then the holders of the common are entitled to a like amount. The
directors may validly determine to declare a $6 dividend on the pre-
ferred and no dividend on the common. But if the board, purp, rting
to exercise its discretion, were to declare a dividend of $12 per share
on the preferred, i. e. $6 for each year of its existence, the rights of
the common 'would be violated, and the holders thereof could enjoin the
dividend in excess of $6.
47
If the directors declare a $6 dividend on the preferred and no divi-
dend on the common, the holders of the latter acquire a dividend credit
of $6 per share. This dividend credit must be paid before any subse-
quent dividends may be received by the preferred. Consequently, if
during the third year Corporation C had net earnings of $6,ooo, thereby
increasing the undistributed profits to $12,000, the common could
nevertheless enjoin a dividend to the preferred for the third year until
the dividend credit of $6 per share on the common, resulting from the
second year's undistributed earnings, had first been paid. If the divi-
dend resolution of the directors specifically stated that they were dis-
tributing the $6,ooo earnings of the third year and not the $6,ooo of
undistributed earnings of the second year, this fact would be completely.
immaterial; the common would nevertheless be entitled to $6 per share
before the preferred received any further dividends.
If the directors declare no dividends at the end of the second year,
the preferred and the common will each have a dividend credit of $6
per share, but the preference of the preferred will still extend to this
credit. Whenever the directors decide to pay a dividend, dividend
credits must first be paid in accordance with their seniority in time. If
the corporation should earn $6,ooo during the third year and declare
no dividend at the end thereof, thus creating a further dividend credit
on the preferred of $6 per share, and if during the fourth year there
should be neither profits nor losses, a dividend of $6,ooo at the end of
the fourth year should go exclusively to the preferred in payment of
their preferred dividend credit for the second year. Any further divi-
dend up to $6,ooo should be paid to the common on account of their
dividend credit for the second year, before the dividend credit of the
preferred for the third year is paid.
Upon a transfer of shares all dividend credits pass from the trans-
feror to the transferee. If a dividend declaration creates a debt of the
47. Collins v. Portland Electric Power Co., 12 F. (2d) 671 (C. C. A. 9th, x926);
12 FLTCHER, op. cit. supra note , at x4o.
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corporation to a class of shareholders to whom a dividend credit is due,
the then holders of such shares are entitled to the declared dividend,
and upon a subsequent transfer of the shares the dividend credit passing
to the transferee is correspondingly reduced.
If the directors declare a dividend on the common in violation of a
prior claim of the preferred, or vice versa, the declaration does not have
the effect of creating a duty in the corporation to pay a dividend to the
shareholders having the prior claim, as the declaration did not designate
them as the recipients of the dividend and they would not be justified in
relying thereon.
If Corporation C earns $6,ooo during its first year but declares no
dividends, and earns another $6,ooo during its second year, the direc-
tors may declare a dividend of $12 per share on the non-cumulative
preferred at the end of the second year, 48 although the dividend pref-
erence of the preferred for a single year is only $6 per share. The
directors may (although they cannot be compelled to do so) pay a
single dividend of a greater amount to the preferred if a dividend credit
on such shares justifies the additional dividend and the funds are law-
fully available.
Illustration z. At its inception Corporation C issues I,ooo com-
mon shares and i,ooo 6% participating preferred shares, all of a par
value of $ioo each. At the end of the first year of its existence Cor-
poration C has net earnings of $14,ooo and the directors pay a dividend
of $6 per share on the preferred and $6 per share on the common.
Since the preferred are participating, the preferred and the common
each have a dividend credit of $i per share in the remaining $2,ooo.
4 9
The preferred and the common are on a parity with respect to this
credit as the preference of the preferred extends only to the designated
amount and not to further dividend participation in excess thereof. If
the corporation earns $io.ooo during the second year, and at the end
thereof the directors declare a dividend of $6 on each share, preferred
and common, the preferred could enjoin all but $r of this dividend to
the common. If the directors desire to pay any dividends at the end of
the second year, they should first pay $i per share to both the common
and the preferred in satisfaction of the dividend credit of the first year;
then any further dividends should be paid to the preferred up to $6 per
share. This would clear up the dividend credit on the preferred and
leave a balance of $4,ooo as to which the common would have a divi-
dend credit of $4 per share.
If the corporation had earned only $4,ooo during the second year
and at the end thereof the directors had declared a dividend of $6 per
48. Note 35 supra.
49. See BERLE, op. cit. supra note 36, at xxz-x3o.
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share on the preferred, the common could have enjoined the entire divi-
dend. If the directors desire to distribute the entire $6,ooo of surplus,
they should pay $i per share to the preferred and to the common, and
then $4 per share to the preferred, leaving the preferred with a dividend
right of $2 per share if cumulative, and no dividend credit if not
cumulative.
If the preferred shares had been non-participating, the common
would have had a dividend credit of $2 per share in the $2,000 of net
earnings remaining after the six percent dividend. This amount might
validly be paid to the common at any time thereafter from any funds
lawfully available for dividends. For example, if after two months of
the second year had elapsed the directors were to declare a $2 dividend
on the common, the rights of the preferred would not be violated, de-
spite the fact that they had not received the amount of their dividend
preference for the year in which this dividend to the common was
paid. 50
IllustratiM 3. At its inception Corporation C issues i,ooo com-
mon shares and i,ooo 6% cumulative preferred shares, all of a par
value of $ioo each. At the end of the first year of its existence Cor-
poration C has net earnings of $12,ooo and the directors pay a dividend
of $6 per share on the preferred, leaving the common with a dividend
credit of $6 per share in the remaining $6,ooo of net earnings. During
the second year the corporation has neither profits nor losses. During
the third year the net earnings are $12,ooo. If at the end of the third
year the directors should declare a dividend of $12 per share on the pre-
ferred, the common could enjoin the entire dividend, despite the iact
that the preferred are cumulative. If the directors desire to pay any
dividends, they must wipe out the dividend credit of $6 per share on
the common since this arose prior to the accumulated back dividends on
the preferred. A payment at the end of the second year of a $6 divi-
dend on the cumulative preferred would also have been subject to in-
junction by the common. The cumulative feature of the preferred
applies only to future earnings and does not alter the rights of other
shareholders which have already accrued as a result of prior undis-
tributed earnings.
At the end of the third year Corporation C's surplus is $i8,ooo.
Accumulated earned surplus is a unitary concept, a single bookkeeping
item. It does not consist of separate funds representing the undis-
tributed net earnings of various past years; it is merely a figure repre-
senting the total amount lawfully available for dividends to the shhre-
holders. The only significance of the figures indicating the net earn-
So. Continental Ins. Co. v. Minneapolis, etc., R. R., 283 Fed. 276 (D. Minn. 1922),
aff'd, n9o Fed. 87 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923).
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ings for individual years is to establish the proportionate rights of
shareholders to such distributions as the corporation may legitimately
decide to make to them. Such distributions all come from a single
source, namely, the assets of the corporation at the time of the distri-
bution. Consequently, if Corporation C determines to distribute its
surplus of $I8,ooo to its shareholders, the fact that $12,000 was earned
during the third year is not material. The significant facts are, in this
order, that $6 per share might have been paid to the common at the end
of the first year and was not, that the cumulative preferred received no
dividends for the second year, and that they have as yet received no
dividends for the third year. The common now have the senior divi-
dend credit; after they have received $6 per share, they will not be
entitled to any further dividends, regardless of the extensiveness of
the corporation's future earnings, until the preferred have received $i2
pcr share, as the dividend right of the preferred will have become the
senior one.
Illustration 4. At its inception Corporation C issues i,ooo com-
mon shares and i,ooo 6% non-cumulative preferred shares, all of a
par value of $ioo each. At the end of the first year of its existence
Corporation C has net earnings of $6,ooo, but the directors declare no
dividends. During the second year Corporation C suffers an operating
loss of $6,ooo. At the end of the third year the corporation has net earn-
ings of $12,ooo. If the directors were to declare a dividend of $6 per
share on the preferred and $6 per share on the common, the preferred
could enjoin the entire dividend on the common. The undistributed earn-
ings of the first year created a dividend credit of $6 per share in favor
of the non-cumulative preferred. The loss of the second year eliminated
the fund lawfully available for dividends, but did not wipe out the
dividend credit. The net earnings of the third year added another $6
per share to the dividend credit of the preferred. Hence the preferred
are entitled to receive $12 per share before any dividends are paid to
the common.
If the net earnings of the first year had been $12,OOO, there would
have been a dividend credit of $6 per share on the common as well as
on the preferred. If the corporation then lost $24.ooo during the sec-
ond year, this would wipe out the surplus available for dividends and
create a deficit (or capital impairment) of $12,OOO; but the dividend
credits of both common and preferred would remain. Now if the cor-
poration were to have an excess of income over expenses, i. e. net earn-
ings, of $6,ooo during the third year, this would reduce the deficit to
$6,ooo, but would not add to the dividend credit of the preferred, for
it is not a fund which might be utilized for the current year's dividends
in jurisdictions which prohibit dividend payments except out of sur-
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plus. Even in jurisdictions which by statute permit current net earn-
ings to be distributed as dividends despite prior capital impairment, the
$6,oo0 of net earnings in the third year would not increase the dividend
credit of the preferred; this sum, if distributed, would be completely
used up by the claims of the existing dividend credits, and therefore
the distribution of these profits would not in fact result in the preferred
receiving any more dividends than they were already entitled to. In
short, additional dividend credits arise only when funds available for
dividends, to which the shareholders are not already entitled, are with-
held from them by the directors. For example, if Corporation C had
suffered an operating loss of $12,ooo during its first year, and had had
net earnings of $6,ooo during the second year, the preferred would
acquire a dividend credit of $6 per share in jurisdictions permitting
current net earnings to be utilized for dividend purposes regardless of
past losses; this is because, if the directors were to distribute this
$6,ooo, it would go to the preferred not in reduction of a dividend
credit but by virtue of a current priority to this extent over the com-
mon. In other jurisdictions, having the normal common law rule that
dividends may be paid only out of surplus, the non-cumulative pre-
ferred would acquire no dividend credit. It may be objected that this
latter result puts the entire loss in the long run upon the preferred and
not on the common, but to the present writer it seems a reasonable con-
clusion that the parties did not intend any claim to dividends to accrue
to the non-cumulative preferred in the absence of any funds which
might lawfully be distributed as dividends.
Some might contend that if Corporation C had had net earnings of
$12,ooo the first year, and a loss of $6,ooo the second year, the effect
of the loss would be to wipe out the dividend credit on the common,
thereby throwing the entire loss on the junior shares.1' This is, of
course, a possible result, but it is wholly inconsistent with the theory
that once a dividend credit (even on common shares) has developed, it
is senior to any dividend claim that may thereafter accrue to any class
of shares, preferred or common, just as, when earnings have been val-
idly distributed to the common, the right to retain such dividends is
unaffected by any subsequent dividend claims that may arise.
If the shares outstanding are cumulative or participating preferred,
the basis for the allocation of losses is the same as that already set forth.
A dividend right regularly accrues to cumulative preferred shares
regardless of earnings, whereas dividend credits on common or non-
cumulative preferred or participating preferred are always the resultant
of undistributed net earnings (there may, as previously indicated, be
5i. See BEtz, op. cit. supra note 36, at Ioi-oo3, 124-r3O.
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priorities among the various holders of dividend claims); but once any
dividend claim has arisen, it is a claim against future dividends that
can be discharged only by payment. Losses affect only the size of the
fund available for dividends and do not alter the previously established
rights of the various shareholders among themselves whenever divi-
dends are distributed. For example, suppose Corporation C to have
outstanding i,ooo common shares and i,ooo $6 cumulative preferred
shares which further entitle the holders, after the common have also
received $6 per share from the net earnings of a given year, to a divi-
dend participation of $2 per share, after which any balance of said net
earnings are payable to the common. If at the end of the first year
Corporation C has net earnings of $17,ooo, there would arise first a
dividend credit of $6 on each preferred share, then a dividend credit of
$6 on each common share, next a dividend credit of $2 on each pre-
ferred share, and finally a dividend credit of $3 on each common share,
These dividend credits must be paid, in this order, before any other divi-
dends are distributed. If the corporation should lose $6,ooo during
the second year, the only effect would be to reduce the funds available
for dividends to $i i,ooo. If the third year produced net earnings of
$4,ooo and the directors should decide to distribute to the shareholders
the resulting surplus of $I5,OOO, $8 per share ($6 plus $2) should go
to each preferred share, and $7 per share ($6 plus $i) to each common,
leaving the common with a dividend credit from the first year of $2
per share, and the preferred, because they are cumulative, with a divi-
dend right of $12 for the second and third years. These dividend
claims should be honored in this order in the event of any subsequent
dividend payments.
Furthermore, a corporation, unless legally obligated to do so, ought
not to make any distributions other than dividends to its shareholders
while dividend claims are unpaid. If the articles stipulate that a class
of shares is subject to redemption or entitled to a capital preference on
dissolution, such rights will take priority over dividend claims. But a
corporation ought not voluntarily to distribute corporate assets to share-
holders, e. g. by purchasing shares, in disregard of its shareholders'
dividend claims. This means, as the English courts have held,52 that a
corporation should never deliberately purchase its own shares, since
such purchases must be limited to surplus, and undistributed surplus
cannot arise without dividend credits also resulting. Indeed, a perni-
cious corporate practice that has flourished especially during depression
years is the use of corporate assets to buy in even cumulative preferred
shares at depressed prices brought about by management withholding
52. Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409 (1887).
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dividends on these very shares. This may redound to the eventual bene-
fit of the common shareholders, whose equity in the enterprise may be
thereby enhanced, but the unfairness to the shareholders who are caused
by this manipulation to sacrifice not only dividends but also market
value is manifest. Consistent adherence to the dividend credit principle
would preclude such injustice.
Theory and Practice
The foregoing discussion reveals that the theory of dividend credit
is not limited to cumulative and non-cumulative preferred shares. Logi-
cally it applies as well to the rights of participating preferred and even
common shares to partake in the distribution of profits after fixed divi-
dend preferences have -been paid. Yet the cases applying this doctrine,
which thus far have reached courts of record, have been confined almost
exclusively to the rights of non-cumulative preferred shareholders.
Some of the reasons for this are readily understandable.
The dividend priorities of cumulative shares are too well estab-
lished to be the subject of litigation. Moreover, where junior (e. g.
common) shares have dividend credits in past undistributed earnings,
they are not likely to assert them against cumulative preferred shares;
current dividends on such preferred shares, not paid now out of present
or past earnings, will have to be paid anyway in the future before the
junior shares can participate in subsequent earnings, and the "bird in
the hand" idea has apparently not been a sufficient incentive to induce
the holders of junior shares to risk the expense of a lawsuit in vindica-
tion of their dividend credits.
Conversely, it was to be expected that litigation would be provoked
by the declaration of dividends upon common shares while past earned
dividends upon non-cumulative preferred shares remained unpaid.
After all, the non-cumulative shares are preferred as to dividends, and
the preference becomes largely illusory, if corporate earnings may in
this fashion be diverted from the preferred to the common.
But the real mystery is that those shareholders, whose rights in
corporate profits are not limited by fixed preferences, have not more
often challenged dividend declarations that violate the principle of divi-
dend credit. If the principle of dividend credit is not adhered to, the
directors may divert earnings from participating preferred shares to
common shares, or vice versa. Moreover, the directors are also in a
position to shift the burden of losses; occurring after the accumulation
of a surplus, from one group of dividend participants to another. Fur-
thermore, on dissolution of a corporation having an accumulated sur-
plus, grave injustice may result to one class or another, if principles of
762 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
dividend credit are ignored.' 3 The only explanation for the paucity of
decisions in this field would seem to be that shareholders and their
advisers have not sufficiently realized that the discretion of directors as
to when profits shall be distributed need not include discretion as to who
shall receive the profits when distributed.
No doubt there will be those who will maintain that however
excellent the dividend credit rule may be in theory, it is utterly unwork-
able in practice. The objection is principally that in the case of a cor-
poration with a large but fluctuating income and a complicated share
structure, it would be too difficult, first, to calculate and, secondly, to
keep track of the amount of undistributed profits to which each class
of shares is annually and in the aggregate entitled. But every corpora-
tion now, for tax and other purposes, has to attempt to figure its annual
net earnings to the very penny, and for any single year it is a compara-
tively simple arithmetical problem to determine how much of the net
earnings will go to each share outstanding at the end of the year, if the
entire net earnings for that fiscal period are to be distributed. Actually,
it is very little more difficult for a corporation to aggregate odd amounts
that would develop to the credit of various classes of shares under this
principle as a result of not distributing net earnings, 54 than it is to
cumulate fixed sums regardless of earnings as in the case of cumulative
preferred shares. At the end of each year the corporation could notify
each shareholder, as is frequently done in the case of insurance com-
panies, of the amount of undistributed surplus to the credit of his shares
for the year and in the aggregate.
Finally, it should be noted that, whatever the drawbacks of the
dividend credit principle from management's standpoint, they are more
than offset by two great advantages to the shareholder. First, the wide-
spread acceptance of this principle should result in a more liberal divi-
dend policy on the part of many corporations, as the possibility of favor-
ing one class of shareholders at the expense of another would no longer
provide an incentive for delay in distributing corporate profits. Cor-
porate shares are becoming less and less attractive as a form of invest-
ment. Management, labor, and even the consumer have reaped the
benefits of large-scale production made possible by the corporate device,
while the shareholder has been increasingly neglected. 55 The arrogant
practices of many corporate officers are in some measure responsible for
this development. The enforcement of the dividend credit principle
could be an important means of establishing in the shareholder a sense
53. KErL, Co.poRATE DmIENDS (194x) 192, r93.
54. A similar accounting problem is involved in determining the annual amount
to which each holder of an income bond is entitled.
55. Fleming, Are Stockholders People?, HARP_'s IMAGAZINE (March, ig4i) 422,
424-
THE DISTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE DIVIDENDS
of greater security and of again arousing in him the active interest of
a proprietor.
Secondly, one of the long-term advantages of the dividend credit
principle is that it would probably induce a gradual simplification of
share structures. An objection sometimes offered to the dividend credit
principle is that, whenever a dividend is paid, there will result disputes
and litigation among the shareholders and with the corporation as to
whether the appropriate amount has been paid to the proper persons.
If this be true (and to the present writer it does not seem inevitable),
the explanation probably lies in the unnecessarily complicated share
structures which so many corporations have developed. Many of the
financial ills of the late twenties and early thirties were a concomitant
of the absurd variety of different types of securities which were in-
vented by corporate managers or promoters either to beguile the unwary
investor or to provide trading ammunition upon corporate reorganiza-
tions where an effort was made to mollify various groups with divergent
claims. A rigid limitation of corporate securities to say three types
would be a salutary development; these might bcfixed interest first
mortgage bond . dumulatie-mon-Eirticipating preferred shares. -and
common shares. Admittedly this would inject an element of rigidity
not now .present in corporate financing, but the advantages to the in-
vestor would more than offset the loss of flexibility which management
would experience. Such a requirement would simplify the application
of the dividend credit rule, and would eliminate most of the uncertain-
ties which at the present time are the major source of conflicts between
shareholders and management concerning dividends.
